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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:
Degree:

The Impact of the ISM Code in Maritime field
MSc

The entry into force of the ISM Code will be one of the most important events in
shipping. The implementation of the ISM Code will bring extensively impact in the
shipping industry. This dissertation tried to analysis the impact of the ISM Code in
the maritime field. It has focused on three main areas, namely the implementation of
the ISM Code, the impact on limitation of liability and the impact on marine
insurance.
The ISM Code only can make functions after it has been implemented properly and
effectively. In order to achieve this objective. Flag States, Port States, Classification
Society and Shipowners shall work together and carry out fully implementation of
the ISM Code. It could not be function well enough if they worked isolation. Any
shipping company who does not implemented the ISM Code sufficiently will face
serious outcome. Ships which do not carry ISM certificates will face negative
consequences, not only they will be detained by Port State Control, but also it is
impossible to find a cargo because most ship-brokers will inevitably make ISM
certification a conditon of charter.
The ISM Code will bring impacts on the shipowners limitation of liability.
Obviously, due to the character of the ISM Code, it is convenient for the claimant to
find some evidences to proof whether the shipowner has actual fault or with the
intent to cause such a loss or with the knowledge that such a loss would probably
result. With the success of such proof, the shipowner will be deprived of the
limitation of liability. With the establishment of the Designated Person(s) with the
ISM system, it is difficult for the shipowner to take a black eye for the deficiency
found on board its ships, if he continue doing so, his limitation of liability will
possibly be challenged.
The ISM Code brings some changes in marine insurance. P&I Clubs changed the
rule of its insurance in the light of the coming into force of the ISM Code. The
insured probably is not entitled to get his cover as a result of the breach of the ISM
Code.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

When reading reports on investigations into maritime casualties over the decades it
becomes clear that most casualties have come about as a result of human failures.
The statistical analyses suggest that around 80 per sent of all shipping accidents are
caused by human error. The underlying truth is that the act or omission of a human
being plays some part in virtually every accident, including those where structural or
equipment failure may be the immediate cause.
For a long time, special emphasis has been laid on utilising high technology in
ship’s construction and equipment.

A great deal of regulations on technical aspects

of shipping have been developed by IMO and national authorities, nevertheless,
such regulations can only achieve part of the objective of safe and pollution-free
ship operations. The task facing us now is to prevent and minimise the scope for
human error which contributes, directly or indirectly to a casualty, as well as we
insist on high standards in ship’s construction and equipment.
In the last few years there have been a significant decline in the number of casualties
due to structure failures. In comparison the human error related casualty ratio has
increased. The often quoted figure of 80 per cent of accidents and casualties being
caused by human error may be on an upward trend. Fragmentation of the industry
and commercial pressures have led to a reduction in operational expertise afloat and
ashore and there is a need to compensate this with a more structured system.

Losses, both of ships and seafarers, on the level of previous years are no longer
acceptable. Nor is damage to the environment through accidental, or indeed
deliberate, pollution. And the ship and the shore must take responsibility. The master
can no longer be left to bear sole responsibility for the operation and safety of his
ship without someone being actively and visibly responsible ashore.
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During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there are several serious maritime disasters
that occurred, which resulted in loss of life of large number of people and as well as
damaged to the environment especially to the marine environment. In March 1989
the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, Prince William Sound near Valdez in
Alaska. The probable cause* of this was, in the words of the US National
Transportation Safety Board(NTSB), "... the failure of the third mate to properly
manoeuvre the vessel because of fatigue and excessive workload;.....the failure of
Exxon Shipping Company to provide a fit master and a rested and sufficient crew for
the Exxon Valdez...” (Jorgen Rasmussen, 1999). Another example is the Ro/Ro
ferry Herald of Free Enterprise, which capsized off Zeebrugge and caused 188
passengers loss of their life. According to the Sheen-Commission report, the main
reasons are as follows:
•

Board of Directors did not appreciate their responsibility;

•

Management, from top down to the junior superintendent shared the
responsibility of the accident.

•

Top to bottom infected with the disease of sloppiness;

•

Failure to give clear orders contributed greatly.

Considering the above facts and the political pressure coming from the international
community, the Assembly of the International Maritime Organisation adopted the
International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution
Prevention, namely the international Safety Management Code(ISM Code) as a
recommendation in 1993 and made it mandatory by means of the 1994 SOLAS
amendments. The Code is unique among IMO Conventions in that it addresses the
management of ships. It is not prescriptive, but defines its objectives and provides a
framework within which shipowners are required to develop a safety management
system appropriate to their operation, thereby imposing a degree of self-regulation.
The entry into force of the ISM Code is the one of the most important events in
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shipping industry this decade. Just as Mr. O’Neil, Secretary-General of IMO, stated
in the foreword to a book on the ISM Code on December 1998:

“ The adoption of the ISM Code is one of the most important development in
maritime safety of the last decade. Previously, IMO’s attempts to improve shipping
safety and to prevent pollution from ships had been largely directed at improving the
hardware of shipping-for example, the construction of ships and their equipment.
The ISM Code, by comparison, concentrates on the way shipping companies are run.
This is important, because we know that human factors accovmt for most accidents at
sea and that many of them can ultimately be traced to management. The Code will
undoubtedly help to raise management standards and practices and thereby reduce
accidents and save lives.”
The ISM Code is the international standard for the safe management and operation of
ships and for pollution prevention. It is obvious that the ISM Code in its entirety
\deals with the human element, after all it is a code on management. In the preamble
it is stated that” The cornerstone of good safety management is commitment from
the top. In matters of safety and pollution prevention it is the commitment,
competence, attitudes and motivation of individuals at all levels that determine the
end result.”

In order to create a safety culture it is necessary to be aware of safety implications.
Then there must be the commitment to do what awareness shows to be necessary.
The next requirement is for people to have competence to do what is necessary in the
right way. It must be realised that competence does not

depend only on the

capability of an individual, but also on the appropriateness of that capability to the
particular task at hand. People are not bom with an attitude. Attitudes are shaped
and developed by both the individuals and the circumstances surrovmding them. If
changes are made to the behaviour or the circumstances which shaped the original
attitudes, then the new circumstances will shape new attitudes.
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As for the

motivation, it is a quite important element to encourage people to fulfil their task as
well as possible. It is linked from the top management to the bottom.
The ISM code will be implemented in two stages depending on the types of ships.
/ t*

The first stage applied for all passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft;
oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and cargo high speed craft of

I 500 grt and above not later than 1®* July, 1998, which counts for a total of around
\ 12,000 ships.

The second stage will apply for all other cargo ships and mobile

offshore drilling units of 500 grt and above.

Shipping companies have the obligation to establish a safety management
system(SMS) to meet the requirements of the ISM Code. There is no excuse for not
complying. Owners have been given ample warning and those who think the Code
will not happen are deluding themselves.

These shipping companies that do not

carry ISM certification could face the following consequences:
•

They will be banned from ports in Europe, North American, the Far East and
many others parts of the biggest trading nations.

•

They could find their insurance cover has been withdraw; many insurance
companies and P&I Clubs have announced that compliance with the ISM Code will
be regarded as an essential condition of insurance.

•

They could find it impossible to find a cargo. Most ship- brokers will inevitably
make ISM certification a condition of charter.

•

They will be forced to try and make a living in the handful of countries where the
Code is not strictly enforced. Even if they are able to find some cargoes to carry, they
will be forced to accept very low rates because the vast majority of shippers will opt
for shipping companies that have ISM accreditation. (Fairplay, 1998)

The entry into force ISM Code has widely potential impacts in the maritime field.
The impacts are not only related to the safety aspects of the ships but also related to
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the commercial and legal aspects of shipowners,

insurers and charters. In this

dissertation, the author will discuss the following issues:
^ In chapter 2, the author will analyse the relationship between maritime casualty and

I the human error as well as the objectives of the ISM Code. With the development of
I the high technology in ship building and equipment, the maritime casualties due to
I structure failures have declined and the human error related casualties ratio has
I

! increased. One solution to the problem is to emphasis the human element through the
' ISM Code and try to reduce maritime casualties due to the hurhan error. Moreover,
' the objectives of the ISM Code will be examined and discuss the way to achieve the

In Chapter 3, the author will describe the responsibilities of Flag States, Port State
Control, Classification Society and Shipowners in the implementation of the ISM
Code. These parties should work together efficiently for the purpose of the ISM
Code implementation to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss of
life, and avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular to the marine
environment and to property.
In Chapter 4, the most important Chapter in the dissertation, the author will focus on
the impact of the ISM Code on the shipowner’s limitation of liability. The related
international conventions with the limitation of liability will be examined.

The

potential impact of the ISM Code on the limitation of shipowner’s liability will be
deeply analysed. The shipowner-ship link, made visible by the ISM requirements for
reporting structures and documentary evidence, will make it very hard for an owner
to limit liability. “ Actual fault or privity” have been in the past the only way in
which liability limitation could be lost. These have been defences in the past but
under the ISM Code it will be too easy for it to be shown that the highest levels of
management in a shipping company were aware of a situation(deferred repairs, for
example) which could lead to an accident. Faced with this prospect, the options are
to do nothing since you are confident in your safety system, do everything possible to

conform with ISM and then more. Cargo owners under the Hague and Hague-Visby
rules may also be able to sue shipowners more easily under ISM, since the same
requirements for reporting and records will strip away the defence of demonstrating
the exercise of due diligence in making the ship seaworthy. Cargo owners will
simply have to show the actual negligence was that of the “directing mind and will”
of the company.
In Chapter 5, the author will discuss the impact of the ISM Code on insurers . P&I
Club had advised it members that compliance with the Code will be made a
condition of cover under the Club’s rules.

Members who fail to comply with

statutory requirements related to the safe management and operation of ships will be
unable to recover claims, whether or not they result from non-compliance. The Club
will also decline to accept as new members any shipowner who do not have valid
ISM certificates.(AR Hill, 1998.).
Conclusion will be addressed in the last Chapter. With the implementation of the
ISM Code around the maritime industry, the potential impacts of the ISM Code will
emerge more and more. We must face the golden opportunity as well as the
challenge resulting from the ISM Code and reduce the cost to the minimum and
achieve the maximum profits during the safe operation of ships and the safe
management of companies.
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Chapter 2

The role of the ISM Code

2.1 Human element and marine casualty

2.1.1 General
The human element in shipping is something that has been talked about for many
years but somehow things have always carried on much as before. Crews continued
to be cut, mainly for economic and competitive reasons. Investment in maritime
education and training was also scaled down, in many cases to levels where the
numbers being trained became insufficient to maintain the required numbers of
qualified seafarers. Warnings of skills shortages and concerns over safety and social
impact largely went unheeded.
For many years solutions to identified safety concerns and the response to incidents
have concentrated on engineering and design aspects. Add a double hull here, install
a watertight bulkhead there, put in an alarm system, improve firefighting and
evacuation systems and so on. All these measures are fine and necessary. But
despite a growing realisation that in themselves these measures are necessary but not
sufficient to improve safety and that the human element in various forms plays a
major role, the industry had not acted on this fact.
So what has changed ? there seems to have been a marked change in attitude in the
industry generally. A recognition has emerged that purely technical and design
solutions to problems have virtually reached saturation point. Harmut Hormaim,
director of ship safety at Germanischer Lloyd, recently commented to ISM: “ in ship
safety we are at a turning point in regulatory matters, moving away form hardware
towards a focus on the human element. Regulation of hardware aspects is now
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comprehensive. It is difficult to see further major advance in hardware safety. Now
the marine community is starting to address the vast void space called the human
element.”

2.1.2 Results of investigation

UK P&I Club seeks real reasons behind costly mistakes
A major investigation into the underlying reasons for shipping insurance claims that
are blamed on human error carried out by the UK P&I Club.
“three of five claims are effectively still caused by human error ” according to Mr
Kerry Lawford, director of loss prevention services. “ why do otherwise well-trained
people make mistakes? What goes wrong?” he asked. It was time to get behind the
label of human error, he said, and discover the real reasons. He was speaking at the
public presentation of the club’s 10-year survey of major claims-that is above
$100000-between 1987 and 1997. Such claims account for a tiny percentage of the
total, only 2 per cent by value. Over the period of the survey, human error accounted
for 58 per cent of them.
In certain circumstances, the survey points out properly trained personnel can
become careless and even reckless.
Specific risk areas it identified are:
•

Language problems in the mixed nationality ships, and between ship and shoreside personnel, particularly when engaged in critical activities such as berthing and
bunkering.

•

Confusion due to poor communication between master and pilot.

•

Fatigue resulting from smaller crews and shorter turnaround times in port.

•

Minor miscalculations leading to ship instability and as a consequence cargo
loss.
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Pride including crew to carry out tasks single-handedly which should be excluded
with assistance.
Calculated risks by masters

and officers

responding

to

commercial

pressures.(The Sea, 2000)
2.1.3 Categories of human error
There are a number of reasons why human error contributed so high percentage
regarding the causes of marine casualties. The major reasons are as follows:

2.1.3.1 Lack of knowledge and/or experience
Some older seafarers do not have sufficient knowledge regarding operating the ship
safely and effectively. There are number of reasons. Some of them had no chance to
attend the maritime academy and accordingly failed to be well-trained, who came to
the ship for service relying on their experience of serving on navy. They feel certain
difficulties to keep abreast of the technological developments not only due to their
poor educational background but also lack of chance to leave the ship to be trained
with the fear of unemployment pressure.

2.1.3.2 Lack of communication
The lack of a common language, mainly during an emergency situation, has proved
to be a contributing factor to the human element affecting maritime safety. Today
multi-national crews are very commonly employed for the purpose of cheaper labour
costs. Clear and understandable communications among multi-national crews is
necessary to ensure the operation of the ship safely. Communication is a key element
in the control of ship operations, and its absence makes marine casualties inevitable.

The lack of communication among multi-national crew members does not only invite
an adverse social environment, but more seriously has negative influences on the
safety, harmony and smoothness of the ship’s routine operations. It is obviously
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important that in a crisis situation they must be able to communicate with each other
more accurately and rapidly rather than just try to utilise a language one is not
familiar with.

2.1.3.3 Fatigue
There are a number of factors which contribute to fatigue on board ships. A number
of accidents or casualties on ships have occurred where the cause of such accidents
could be the fatigue on the ship’s crew members.
Fatigue is defined as a state or condition of exhaustion, weariness or extreme
depletion of physical or mental reserves or capabilities.

Fatigue results in the

degradation of human performance, the slowing down of physical and mental
reflexes and/or the impairment of the ability to make rational judgements. Fatigue
may be induced by factors such as prolonged periods of mental or physical activity,
inadequate rest, adverse environment factors, physiological factors and /or stress or
other psychological factors. (Annex of Resolution A.772-18).
Fatigue is always accompanied by the result of reduced crews, less experienced or
well-trained seafarers. The most common factor of fatigue are due to:
•

unplanned maintenance programme which put pressure on crew members.

•

The quick loading and unloading of cargoes

•

Not properly laid down routine on board

•

Lack of rest on the job

•

Excessive workloads

•

Interpersonal relations

•

Cultural changes
Some of the environment conditions that create fatigue situation on board are:

•

vibration

•

noise

•

ship’s motion

•

bad weather condition

•

unsafe or hazardous vessel conditions
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•

type of trading
the group on the ship which is mostly exposed to fatigue is the masters and senior
deck officers, chief engineer and senior engineer officers as they are all loaded with
responsibilities of safe running of the vessel.
Some of the contributing factors could be:

•

longer pilotage distance in heavy traffic areas

•

longer stand-by period

•

short sea passages on some trades

•

fast tank cleaning due to loading and unloading

•

constant engine breakdown

•

blackout situation on board.

2.1.3.4 Stress
Stress on crew members is a very important issue that shipping companies or shorebased organisation should take into consideration. The trends within the shipping
industry may lead to serious stress and lower morales which in turn are affecting the
ships safety.
The nature of seafaring which involves long periods of isolation from home, families
and the shore community at large, is creating great stressful atmosphere. Some of the
causes which contribute to the problem, a combination of factors such as less time in
port, smaller crew member(reduced manning), workload and condition of the ship
can be much to bear.
The behaviour of some shipping companies adds to low morale and serious stress
conditions onboard. It could be the non-payment of wages or very low paid wages
and poor communication problems on mixed-nationality crew ships. Inadequate food
and the slow delivery of mail to seafarers increase the stressful conditions onboard.
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Religious background and differences in culture contribute to an increase in stress on
the crew. Also there are perceived

fears which prevent many seafarers from

reporting many of the deficiencies or safety infringement on board ship. They close
their eyes and mouths when it comes to matters of safety and they endanger their
lives. The fear because of which they refrain from complaining could be for many
reasons such as being replaced by another seafarer who can be paid less. They may
also be the breadwinners of their entire families or relatives and can not afford to lose
their work even though conditions on the ship are unbearable.
If the crew are given more responsibility in doing or running things themselves with
the support from the shore-based organisations, then they would feel that they are
being valued and would be far less stressed which will increase their ability in
performing their duties. It would definitely increase the level of safety onboard ship
and all the crew members would live onboard in peace and harmony.

2.1.4 Suggestions for reducing human errors
In order to prevent or eliminate the human error in the safe operation of ships, the
following aspects must be taken into consideration and highlighted.

2.1.4.1 Emphasise training of seafarers in accordance with STCW78/95
Attempting to improve the human element, the STCW78 Convention was principally
revised so as to produce new STCW95 Convention which entered into force in
February 1997. An important feature of the STCW95 is the mandatory Part A of the
STCW Code which outlines in detail not only the compliance on which syllbus of
courses should be based but also assessment methods and even requiring assessment
by demonstrated skill where applicable.
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Continuous training is necessary to keep abreast of the rapid technological
developments in the shipping industry. Most of the accidents on board ships are
caused by operational errors despite the fact that the international community is
trying hard in the training of seafarers.
It is always possible to produce better trained crews to do their job, the training effort
should concentrate not only on producing better,

well-trained and motivated

management and crew for the future, but also on upgrading and better motivating
existing personnel.
There should be review training for older seafarers who left maritime academies
many years ago for upgrading due to the technological developments in the maritime
sector. Most accidents or incidents on ships are also caused due to lack of knowledge
of sophistication of the systems and the equipment on the ship. Therefore, complete
understanding of the system is required by the operators to achieve correct running of
the ships.
It is important that these older seafarers keep abreast with the present day
developments in shipping industry. Older seafarers who are used to the old fashion
ways of navigation or engine room complexities would be able to cope with the
present day ship operations as the result of the training.

In China, at the current stage, the Chinese seafarers usually are convened on the
maritime universities for training for the purpose of the eligibility and passing the
certificate examination. If a seafarer can pass the written examinations carried out
by China Maritime Safety Administration, obviously he can obtain the related
qualification certificate regardless whether he is competent for his specific post on
board the ship. It is hardly to assess the real ability of the seafarer regarding his
service on board the ship. Particularly, it is very difficult to assess the English skills
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of the seafarer such as speaking ability and listening ability on the basis of the fact of
passing the written English test.

With the complete implementation of the STCW78/95, the seafarers have to be
trained not only for the eligibility certificates but also for the assessment of the
practical skills. In other words, a seafarer can not obtain his certificates until both his
written examinations and assessment meet the minimum requirements of the
Convention. Moreover, the senior officers are required to be trained on related
simulators for the improvement of the safety at sea and prevention of pollution as
well.

2.1.4.2

Stringent implementation of the ISM Code

As mentioned in the Chapter I, one of the objectives of the ISM Code is to minimise
the scope of poor human decisions which contribute directly or indirectly to a
casualty or pollution accident. It is important that shipping companies adopt a human
element perspective or attitude so as to make positive and effective changes to
maritime safety and protection of the marine environment. In identified risks, as
required by the ISM Code, the company should consider “fatigue” as a primary
contributing factor for many foreseeable risks. Companies are encouraged to review
their laid down policies and operational procedures and give due consideration for
aspects such as on board work schedules regarding fatigue. Each company should
develop individual strategies to manage the fatigue issue to arrive at an optimum
operating safety standard.

2.1.4.3 Motivation
People are not motivated when they do not know how well they are doing in their
working places. They need to know what is expected of them and they need to know
how well or poorly they have performed. People do not want to have their
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personalities treated as company property, but they are eager to learn how well they
have done in accomplishing the objectives of their job.

When morale and motivation are low due to any cause such as severe boredom,
fatigue, depression, lack of job satisfaction, anxiety etc, then functional performance
is diminished accordingly. It is said that “any circumstance significantly diminishing
or degrading human performance or functional potentials could be due to low morale
or motivation.”

The most vital item in safe manning of a vessel is motivated crew members . If a
seafarer only works for his daily bread or wages, he will never do a good job. But by
getting a sense of great importance with his employer, partners and teamwork within
the ship’s staff would give great access to job satisfaction which is essential in our
day-to-day activities.

With regard to motivation, it will be even more important when one is talking about
reduced crews since the workload increases. Seafarers can be motivated to practice
safe behaviour if incentives are given which correspond to their social and physical
needs. If the safety aspects are a high priority goals for a shipping company, then
the seafarers will be motivated to pay attention to safety.

2.2

Objectives of the ISM Code

A key feature of the ISM Code is that it does not introduce any new technical
standards, but that its operation should ensure that all relevant existing rules and
regulations are complied with. As defined in the ISM Code, the objectives of the
ISM Code covers the following aspects:
•

Ensuring safety at sea
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•

Prevention of human injury or loss of life

•

Avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular to the marine
environment and to property.
During the past years the international maritime coimnunity has concentrated more
attention on ships and their equipment and also adapted adequate relevant
conventions and codes in respect of the safety at sea and pollution prevention. The
Code together with existing conventions and codes represents an adequate set of
requirements to guarantee a good safety level. However, the rules on their own are of
little value unless they are effectively implemented. The problem is not lack of
standards or regulations but rather

their inadequate implementation and

enforcement. So the ISM Code moved towards human issues both of training of
seafarers and the exercise of responsibility by those operating shipping companies.

The safe and efficient operation of ships depends on the Holy Trinity of
management:
•

Well designed, constructed and maintained ships

•

Capable, committed management personnel

•

Competent, qualified and experienced seafarers.

If either of the foregoing is deficient, the whole operation will be jeopardised and
problems and accidents will occur. This is why the ISM Code has come into being to
ensure that all three of these requirements are equally addressed by an Owner or
Manager. (Jhc, 1996)

The Code sets down certain requirements and guidelines. How the company achieve
compliance with these requirements is the company’s responsibility. Actually, a
company does not need to replace its existing systems and procedures, what a
company need to do is to modify if required and to re-organise the dociunentation
and ensure it fully meet the requirements of the ISM Code. It is necessary for a
company to document its policies, procedures and operating instructions to ensure
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that every one in the company, both ashore and afloat, understands how the company
wishes to operate. Also without procedures being documented, it would not be
possible to show objective evidence to a third party(the Flag State Administration)
that the company conduct its affairs in a planned and effective manner.

Each company should establish a Safety Management System(SMS) to ensure
compliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and applicable codes, guidelines
and standards recommended by the IMO, Administrations, classification societies
and maritime industry organisations are taken into accoimt. The objectives of the
SMS should:
•

Provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment

•

Establish safeguards against all identified risks and

•

Continuously improve safe management skills for personnel ashore and aboard
ships, including preparing for emergencies related both to safety and environment
protection.(Section 1.2.2, ISM Code)

17

Chapter 3

Implementation of the ISM Code

3.1 Flag States responsibility

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) establishes the fundamental
principles and thereby makes it clear that having a shipping register is not an
unfettered right of a sovereign state but one which is qualified as a result of the
obligations imposed on the state, especially with regard to ensuring compliance with
international minimum safety, pollution prevention and social standards.

The duties and responsibilities of flag states are firmly established in international
law and provisions are binding all states. All flag states should abide by their
international obligations and take the necessary enforcement measures so as to secure
the implementation of the ISM Code by vessels flying their flag.

The efforts of Flag States are of primary importance in ensuring that ships conform
to international safety standards such as the ISM Code. That is why the Maritime
Safety Committee of IMO is currently looking into improving Flag State
implementation of the main IMO safety conventions through its FSI Sub-Committee,
as well as focusing on streaming the rights and obligations of port States.

The Flag State must be responsible for the following aspects in respect of the
implementation of the ISM Code efficiently and sufficiently.

3.1.1 Establishing the necessary national legislation to guide

proper

implementation of the ISM Code

Every administration must have in place the necessary national legislation covering:
•

Scope of application
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1
•

Verification and certification

•

Entry into force and

•

The code itself.
With regard to verification and certification the legislation must cover audits(initial,
periodical and renewal) and the certificates(DOC and SMC), including conditions for
their validity.
Moreover, it is necessary to develop the national guidelines to companies on the
following;

•

How to apply for certification?

•

The documentation need when applying

•

How audits will be organised and carried out

•

The structure of the cooperation between the company and the Adnminstration.

•

Such guidelines should be developed in close cooperation with the maritime
industry in the country, i.e. shipowners and trade unions.

3.1.2 Establishing control mechanism to ensure the ISM Code being properly
implemented
A large number of Administrations have delegated fully or in part their statutory
work to Classification Societies. It is also the case with regard to the implementation,
verification and certification of the ISM Code.

Even if an Administration decided to delegate in full all work concerning the ISM
Code, the necessary national legislation must be developed and adopted and some
guidance must be given by the Administration to the Societies and to the companies.
The Administration which delegates its audits and certification work to the
Classification Society must establish some control mechanism to be able to monitor
the work being carried out on their behalf and ensure the related certificates have
been issued in accordance with the requirements of the ISM Code. Each
Administration must be aware that the responsibility can never be delegated to other
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parties such as the Classification Societies. It is always the first responsibility of the
Flag State to ensure ships flying its flag to implement the ISM Code properly.
3.1.3 Providing qualified personnel involving the ISM Code.

All Administrations should also have properly qualified persoimel to be used for
verification and certification purposes. This applies in both cases, when
Administration carries out the actual work itself or if it decides to delegate the work.
The auditor must possess adequate experience of the operation of ships and
knowledge of a company’s shore-based operations, he or she must also have solid
knowledge of relevant rules and regulations. Even if the audits and certification
work have been delegated to other parties, an Administration still must monitor the
work done on its behalf, and in order to be able to do that the qualified personnel is
needed. In addition, these Administrations who decide to carry out auditing and
certification themselves must also consider the need for internal procedures and
instructions for their auditors.

3.1.4 Taking measures for enforcement of the implementation of the ISM Code
Flag states should also consider taking additional measures such as bringing
proceedings against vessels flying their flag which are operating without the required
ISM certification, and imposing penalties of adequate severity to discourage such
violations of international minimum rules and standards. The Flag State must be
aware that Port State Control can never substitute the Flag State though sometimes
the Port State can find the sub-standard vessel and force it to take appropriate
corrective measures to meet the requirements of the relevant conventions.

3.2

Port State Responsibility

3.2.1 General
Port State Control(PSC) which means the inspection of foreign flag vessels visiting
national ports has been defined as the last safety net in maritime safety. PSC is
recognised as being a step in the right direction towards the eradication of
substandard ships, when it is carried out in accordance with IMO Assembly
resolutions and recommendations.

Port State Control is described as a secondary tier of enforcement, the first
responsibility for compliance with international convention standards remains with
the Flag State. Port states are not obligated to inspect foreign ships, but do so in the
interests of safety and pollution prevention. While Flag States are responsible for the
eiiforcement of IMO Conventions, PSC is seen as fulfilling a caretaker role in terms
of supervising the application of Conventions. Port State Control aims at eliminating '
the operation of substandard ships but it is not a substitute for the Flag State’s
responsibilities. The increasing failure on the part of some Flag States to effectively
implement and enforce international standards for safety and pollution prevention
has led to the increased strengthening of the role of the Port State as a policing
mechanism for the shipping industry and a “safety net” for the Flag State.

In recent years.

Port State Control has become a key element in singling out

unscrupulous operators and eventually eliminating substandard vessels. It is now
commonly acknowledged that Port State Control will play an important role in
determining whether the implementation of the ISM Code on board ship is as
effective as desired. The role of the Port State comes into view in Regulation 6 of
-----------------------

----------- --------------- —~ —------------- ------------------- —

Chapter IX^hich stipulates that a ship shall be subject to control in accordance with
Regulation XI/4. Certificates shall be treated as those issued under Regulation 1/12 or
1/13 and therefore the control provisions of Regulation 1/19 should also be
considered relevant in this context. In practical terms this means that ^rt S_tate
Control Officers(PSCO) will also verify the Document of Compliar]|l(DOC)jndjhe
Safety Management Certificate(SMC) on board the ships which have to comply.
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3.2.2 Control Procedures on ISM Code by Port States
The Port State Control Committee of the Paris MOU, recognising the importance of
the control procedures contained in the ISM Code, has adopted Provisional
Guidelines for the Control on the ISM Code, and decided that the implementation
dates regarding certification will be strictly enforced.
t

The provisional guidelines include the following procedures.
•

during the initial inspection, the DOC and the SMC will be verified. An SMC is
not valid unless the operating company holds a valid DOC for that ship type.

•

When ISM certification is absent or inaccurate or detainable deficiencies in other
areas are foimd, the ship shall be subject to a more detailed inspection.

•

If no SMC can be produced on board, the ship shall be detained until such
certificates have been provided.
When the flag state or the company do not or can not provide valid ISM certification,
the detention may be raised, the ship shall be refused access to all Paris MOU ports
until valid ISM certificates can be provided.
The Safety Management Certificate represents the flag state’s verification that the
vessel has an adequate safety management system in place that complies with the
ISM Code.

Under the Port State Control program, this certificate, required by

chapter IX of SOLAS, will be examined along with the vessel’s other required
international certificates. In addition, a copy of the company’s Document of
Compliance, issued to the owner, manager or bareboat charterer, will be examined
during the boarding. Of course, a company must hold a valid Document of
Compliance endorsed for specific vessel types before a Safety Management
Certificate can be issued to its vessels.
Upon completion of the document check, the boarding officers will conduct a general
walk-through of the vessel as part of the port state control examination. If, during the
general examination, the boarding team establishes” clear grounds” to believe that
the condition of the vessel, its equipment or crew does not correspond substantially

22

with the particulars of the vessel’s certificates, the validity of the safety management
system will be questioned and the examination will be expanded into the area of the
ISM Code compliance.
The expanded examination will generally be limited to the area of concern. Serious
structural deficiencies or significant problems in life-saving, fire-fighting, machinery
or pollution prevention, along with poorly maintained equipment and structures as
well as inadequate training, will give the boarding team cause to question the
validity of the ship’s safety management system. The first part of the expanded ISM
Code’s examination will involve a review of the vessel’s safety management manual.
The following items will be checked for inclusion in the manual:
•

the company’s safety and environment protection policy;

•

procedures for preparation and response to emergency situations, including
steering failures, loss of bridge control, fire, abandoning ship, groimding, flooding,
collision, medical emergencies, oil spills and emergency drills;

•

the company’s designated person for the safety management system;

•

procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the provisions of
the code to the designated person and finally

•

written operational procedures and maintenance manuals required by the safety
management manual to be on board and understood by the responsible crew
members.

3.2.3

Operational requirements

During an expanded examination, the following operational requirements of the ISM
Code will also be verified:
•

the officers and crew are familiar with the safety management system and
procedures related to their duties;

•

The company training programme is in place for all personnel, including new and
transferred persons, and all personnel to be familiar with their duties.
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•

The ship’s officers are familiar with the schedule of internal audits specified in
the safety manual and able to verify that internal audits have taken place. The port
state control officer(PSCO) will not examine the results of internal audits, he/she will
only verify that they are being conducted.

•

The PSCO will, however, examine the results of the last external audit performed
by the organisation issuing the ISM certificates, including the status of any open non
conformities.

•

The PSCO will verify that the procedures relating to the deficient system are
documented as required by the safety manual and that the appropriate individuals are
familiar with the procedures.

•

If routine maintenance is required, the PSCO will verify that maintenance was
performed and recorded as required.

•

The expanded examination will then be conducted by verifying that the
appropriate non-conformities are documented and the safety management system is
in fact put to use for the continuous improvement of vessel operations.

Regulation 6 of Chapter IX of SOLAS authorises control of a vessel for noncompliance with the vessel’s Safety Management Certificate in accordance with
Chapters I and XL
Vessels will be detained under this authority only if the required certificates are not
on board or an expanded ISM Code examination reveals serious non-conformities
with the ISM Code include:
•

a lack of the required certificates attesting to the validity of the safety
management system.

•

Lack of a safety management manual or

•

Major safety system deficiencies where, for instance, critical systems procedures
required by the safety manual are not on board and the systems in question are so
severely deteriorated as to make the vessel unseaworthy or constitute a threat to the
crew or the marine environment.
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In 1998 the Paris MOU Port State Control Committee agreed to mount a
Concentrated Inspection Campaign aimed at ships entering its region to which the
International Safety Management Code applied. The campaign, which was held in
conjunction with Tokyo MOU, ran from 1 July to 30 September 1998. First results
showed that a total of 1575 eligible ships were inspected during the campaign. A
uniform questionnaire was used* by Port State Control Officers to test key elements of
the ship’s safety management system. A total of 81 ships were detained in port for
major non-conformities in their systems, resulting in an average detention percentage
of 5.1%. Three ships have been banned from the Paris MOU region for not having
ISM certificates on board and a safety management system in place. These ships will
not be allowed to enter any of the Paris MOU ports until evidence has been provided
that a certified management system is in place. (BIMCO, 1999)

Taking the implementation dates into account, ships shall be subject to control in
accordance with regulation XI/4. This implies that when the PSCO has clear grounds
for believing that the master and crew are not familiar with essential shipboard safety
procedures, operational drills and demonstrations may be required.
If the operational proficiency of the crew is not of an acceptable level, the ship may
be detained. This decision will be based on the opinion of the PSCO.
Although the ISM Code is related to a documented and approved safety management
system, it is obvious that there has to be a clear link with the officers and crew on
board. If the crew only considers the management system as a piece of paper without
following the principles in their day to day practice on board, deficiencies and non
conformities are to be expected on board.
The ISM Code represents part of the culmination of an evolving recognition within
the maritime shipping community that the human element is a critical factor in
preventing casualties or pollution incidents. The scope of the relevant IMO and ILO
conventions has now effectively been expanded to address the human element, as

25

well as engineering, design and operational concerns. However, as with any
convention, unless implemented they can not serve the purpose for which they were
created. It is the obligation of all responsible parties(ie owners, flag states and
classification societies) to properly implement the conventions in order to eliminate
substandard shipping effectively.

3.3 Classification Society’s Responsibility
The greatest contribution to improve maritime safety can only come from higher
conformance by the world fleet to recognised IMO Convention and international
safety standards. The ISM Code is therefore a vital instrument to bring the
improvements expected by the international community. Improved and consistent
compliance through stronger enforcement of international rules and regulations are
central objectives of the ISM Code.
To comply with the ISM Code, shipowners are required to develop, implement and
maintain a Safety Management System(SMS), with conformance of shore-based
management operations to standards validated by a Document of Compliance(DOC).
The SMS also requires audited compliance of vessels to retain mandatory Safety
Management Certificates(SMCs). What is the International Association of
Classification Society(IACS) role in terms of the implementation of the ISM Code?
According to the author’s generalizations Classification Society must be responsible
for the following aspects:
3.3.1 Issuing the related certificates on behalf of Flag Administrations
Through delegation by Flag Administrations, much of the audit workload for Code
compliance will be undertaken by the lACS societies, which have a unique technical
understanding of the world merchant fleet and the Conventions on which the Code is
based. Many Flag Administrations have delegated the LACS societies to issue the
Safety Management Certificates(SMC) for ships due to lack of resources, and some
Flag Administrations also delegated the LACS societies to issue the Document of
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Compliance(DOC) for a shipping company. Therefore, the lACS must control the
ISM Code certification delivery and ensure that the ISM Code certification services
are under the responsibility and authority of the lACS Member Society and not of
any of its subsidiary bodies or sub-contractors.

China Classification Society(CCS), one of the lACS members, has been contributing
many tasks regarding the implementation of the ISM Code. China Maritime Safety
Administration has delegated the CCS to audit and issue a Safety Management
Certificate(SMC) for each of Chinese ships. However,

issuing a Document of

Compliance(DOC) for a shipping company still has been carried out

by the

Administration themselves. A total number of 756 ships already carry the SMCs
issued by the CCS. Below is the list giving details regarding the SMCs of Chinese
ships.

Flag

ship type

number

China

Bulk carrier

134

China

Chemical tanker

13

China

Gas carrier

23

China

Oil tanker

91

China

Other cargo ship

129

China

passenger high speed craft

54

China

Passenger ship

9

Hong Kong, China

Bulk carrier

23

Hong Kong, China

Other cargo ship

Liberia

Bulk carrier

Liberia

Oil tanker

Liberia

Other cargo ship

7

Malta

Bulk carrier

6

Marshall

Bulk carrier

1

Panama

Bulk carrier

98

1
29
4

27

Panama

Gas carrier

Panama

Oil tanker

5
28

Panama

other cargo ship

41

Panama

Passenger ship

2

Singapore

Bulk carrier

6

Singapore

Oil tanker

5

Singapore

Oil tanker/Chemicaltanker

1

St. Vincent and the Grenadines Bulk carrier

20

St. Vincent and the Grenadines Oil tanker

1

St. Vincent and the Grenadines Oil tanker/Chemicaltanker

2

St. Vincent and the Grenadines Other cargo ship

22

Vanuatu

Oil tanker

1

3.3.2 Establishing the procedures to train the certification auditors

ISM Code certification requires profound maritime experience. The certifying
organisation must possess sufficient knowledge and expertise in mandatory
classification and statutory requirements as well as in* the process and procedures to
ensure complete and accurate application of mandatory rules and regulations.
Qualification for auditors therefore include the need for thorough knowledge of the
mandatory rules and regulations governing ship’s safety and pollution prevention.
ISM Code audits may only be performed by qualified auditors who have experience
in ship operations or in relevant statutory and classification requirements.

The lACS expert working group on ISM which first met in 1993 identified the need
for complete training programme for its auditors involved in certification. This was
developed and implemented. It involves five modules which take a minimum of two
weeks in addition to participating in actual audits, both of companies and ships. This
lACS training programme is mandatory, the first time such a common training
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requirement has been made so for lACS members. The implementation of training is
also audited under the lACS Quality System Certification Scheme.

3.3.3 Avoiding the conflict of interest between consultancy and certification

An lACS Member verifying ISM Code compliance must ensure that independence
exists between personnel providing consultancy and those providing certification.
Some shipping companies sometimes invited the employee of the lACS members to
assist them to complete establishing the ISM systems, in that case, if the employee
carried out the audits of the same shipping company as an ISM auditor, it means that
he audited his own systems, in which case it is hard to ensure that the systems have
met with the ISM requirements. Therefore, the activities of consultant and audits
must be separated by the lACS Members.

However, it must be remembered that lACS members are acting as delegated agents
for flag administrations. The ISM Code was not made by classification societies and
it is not a classification rule. It was made by IMO members states as an amendment
to the 1974 SOLAS Convention. Each member state, as a flag administration, is
therefore responsible for its timely implementation. lACS is committed to supporting
the flag states wherever possible and has played a full part in the development of the
ISM Code over the past years.(James Bell, Fairplay, 1998)
The objective for lACS members has been to seek consistency and uniformity of
implementation. Given the thousands of ships and hundreds of companies that are
involved in the certification process, this is not an easy task.

3.4 shipping companies responsibility

When something goes wrong on board a ship, by tradition the master has been held
responsible, while those back home in the boardroom usually escaped censure. The
ISM Code is changing that by censuring that a shipping company’s management is
held accountable for incidents involving its ships. It calls for companies to have
safety management plans for every ship in their fleet and, because it has been ,made
mandatory through the SOLAS Convention, the Code is also subject to port state
control.(William A O’Neil, BIMCO review, 1999)
the ISM Code requires a company, which is defined as the owner of the ship or any
other organisation or person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has
assumed the responsibility of operation of the ship from the shipowner and who, on
assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all duties and responsibility
imposed by the Code, to set up their Safety Management System to address and
document the following aspects of safety as identified in the ISM Code:
Safety and Environment Policy
Company Responsibility and Authorities
Appointing the “Designated Persons”
Master’s Responsibility and Authority
Resources including Personnel
Development of Plans for Shipboard operations
Emergency preparedness
Reporting and Analysis of Non-conformance, Accidents, Hazardous Occurrence
and Near Misses
Preventive Maintenance of Ship and Equipment
Control of Documentation
Company Safety Verification, Review and Evaluation
Third party Certification, Verification and Control

3.4.1 Safety and environment policy
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The first step is to set out the company’s objectives which will start with policies
regarding safety and pollution prevention. The policies must be properly thought-out
describing in a clear and concise manner how these objectives will be achieved and
be imderstood at all levels within the organisation.

It will also imderline the

company’s commitment especially that of senior management. Just to say some nice
words and thereafter do something else would be directly counterproductive.

3.4.2 Company responsibility and authority
The administrative structure of the company and the operating structure on board
ship should be clearly identified including the inter-relationship of the various
positions both ashore and afloat with special regard to the “Designated Persons
ashore”. The company should ensure that adequate resources are made available and
this will include financial, material and human resources. Every person who has
responsibility or authority for safety matters must have these clearly defined in order
that they can efficiently fulfil their tasks.

3.4.3 Designated Persons
For a Safety Management System to function effectively it is necessary for one
person to co-ordinate and monitor all safety and pollution prevention matters both
ashore and afloat. In large companies it may be necessary to split the fleet, in which
case there can be more than one Designated Person Ashore(DPA). Where the DPA
does not have overall authority, it is imperative that there is direct access to the
highest level of management to ensure that any required action which is considered
necessary will be taken by senior management in a timely manner.

3.4.4 Master’s responsibility and authority
The company must clearly define and document the Master’s responsibility and
authority to ensure there is no misunderstanding especially in times of emergency. It
is necessary to clearly establish that the Master has overriding authority and
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responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety of the crew, the vessel and
pollution prevention and to expect the company’s full support and assistance
following a major incident. The Master’s role in motivating the crew in safety
matters must be established in the SMS and he should be given every encouragement
and assistance in implementing the company’s policies and procedures and ensuring
that the crew are well aware of the SMS and their part in its implementation.

3.4.5 Resources including Personnel
The company must ensure that adequate resources are made available to develop and
maintain an effective Safety Management System. They will required to ensure that
they appoint adequately qualified and experienced personnel both ashore and afloat
and with special regard to the appointment of Masters.

3.4.6 Development of shipboard operations
Key shipboard operations involving safety of personnel and ship including pollution
prevention should be identified and assigned to qualified and capable personnel with
emphasis on preventive actions. Special and critical shipboard operations including
contingency plans must be addressed and adequate procedures developed,
implemented and recorded.

3.4.7 Emergency preparedness
Procedures and guidance instructions are required to be developed and made
available to ensure that potential emergency situations can be dealt with quickly and
effectively. Integrated contingency planning between shore and ship must be
consistent to ensure the smoothest of operations during times of extreme pressure.
Plans and drills for shore and shipboard contingencies should be reviewed at regular
intervals and amended as necessary.

3.4.8 Reporting and analysis of non-conformances
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As effective SMS will rely on a concise procedure for reporting accidents, hazardous
occurrences, near misses and non-conformances. Good feedback from all sections of
the company and especially from the ships must be encouraged. Any deviation from
the SMS procedures and instructions will require to be documented and reported to
the shore-based management and evidence of effective corrective action having been
taken must also be shown.

3.4.9 preventive maintenance
It is crucial to the success of the SMS that adequate provisions are made to ensure
that as a minimum requirement, ships are maintained in accordance with statutory
rules and regulations. Additional requirements to meet company standards should be
established and clearly communicated to all personnel. The SMS should provide for
specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of equipment and systems.

3.4.10 Documentation
The company should ensure that all docmnentation is controlled and that documented
procedures and instructions are available for use at the relevant locations. That
changes have been approved by authorised personnel and obsolete documents are
withdrawn and properly disposed-of. Records must be readily available and retained
in a manner that will ensure they do not suffer from deterioration.

3.4.11 Internal auditing and review
Internal audits of the Safety Management System must be carried out to evaluate the
effectiveness of the policies , procedures and instructions, and to ensure that the
system continues to be effective. The results of audits, non-conformance, analysis,
corrective actions, reports and inspections require to be reviewed by senior
management to ensure that the safety system is maintained and continually
improved.
3.4.12 Certification, verification and control
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A Document of Compliance(DOC) should be issued to every company complying
with the requirements of the ISM Code by the Administration, by an organisation
recognised by the Administration or by the Government of the coimtry, acting on
behalf of the Administration in which the company has chosen to conduct its
business.

A Certificate, called a Safety Management Certificate, should be issued to a ship by
the Administration or organisation recognised by the Administration which should
periodically verify the proper fimctioning of the ship’s SMS as approved.
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Chapter 4 the Impact of the ISM Code on Limitation of Liability

4.1 General

Those outside the shipping and transportation business find it difficult to understand
why shipowners and similar transporters should be in the uniquely privileged
position of being able to limit their liability in respect of claims which are made
against them. Why do shipowners and transporters enjoy this privilege? This right
arises by operation of law and not by contract.

An eminent English judge summed up the position as follows:” limitation of liability
is not a matter of justice. It is a matter of public policy which has its origin in history
and its justification in convenience.’’(Richard Williams, 1997)

Legal limitation of the liability of shipowners for loss or damage arising on the
connection with the operation of the ship has long traditions in international maritime
law. Although the legal regimes have varied with time and place, they have two
principles in common:
(1)

the legal limit of liability varies, generally speaking, with the size of the ship, and

(2)

the shipowner is not entitled to limit his liability if the damage is attributable to
his personal fault or neglect.

4.2 Two types of limitation
Specific or contractual limitation includes the provisions in the various International
Conventions covering carnage of goods and passengers by sea, namely the Hague
Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules in respect of carriage of goods
and the Athens Convention in respect of carriage of passengers. Also under the
specific heading, there are other regimes established by the International
Conventions in respect of oil pollution, nuclear liability and more recently HNS. The
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characteristic of this limitation is that it applies to specific types of claim. The
specific or contractual limitation provisions broadly apply to “the carrier”, which
includes the owner or charterer entering a contract with the shipper(Hague and
Hague-Visby Rules), and any person by or in whose name a contract has been
concluded with a shipper or who actually performs all or part of the
carriage(Hamburg Rules and Athens Convention)
Global limitation relates to claims from all and any source and is generally applied
after any applicable specific limitation provisions, although it does not apply at all to
claims in respect of liability for oil pollution covered by the Civil Liability
Convention(CLC) where the limitation regimes are totally independent and stand
alone.

There have been two international conventions setting out this type of

limitation-the 1957 Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners
of Seagoing Ships(the 1957 Convention) which is now of fairly limited application
and the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976( the 1976
Convention) which is increasingly becoming the international standard.
The difference between these two conventions is broadly that the 1957 Convention
provides for lower limits but it is easier for a claimant to challenge and break the
limit whereas the 1976 Convention provides for higher limits( soon to be
substantially increased when the 1996 Protocols come into force internationally) but
those limits are much more difficult to challenge.

4.3 “The actual fault or privity” standard
the actual fault or privity standard exists in the 1957 Convention. This convention is
no longer in force in England, nor in most other English law based jurisdictions,
although it still applies in Singapore. The right to limit liability imder the 1957
Convention is granted to a shipowner “ unless the occurrence giving rise to the claim
resulted from the actual fault or privity of the owner”. In England the burden of

36

proving the absence of fault or privity has lain on the owner(it is always particualrly
difficult to prove a negative), whereas the civil law system in Europe and elsewhere
have placed the burden of proving the existence of fault or privity on the claimant
seeking to break limitation.
The meaning of “actual fault or privity of the owner” has been the subject of much
litigation before the courts.
The primary problem has been to establish who, in law, constituted the “owner”.
This was a particularly difficult question where the vessel concerned owned by a
company. The problem was solved in most countries that adopted the Convention by
the development of the concept of the “alter ego”. This concept first saw light of day
in the United Kingdom in the Lennard’s Carrying Co. case where the court was
required to consider the problem in the context of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894.
The court held that, upon the true construction of section 503 of the MSA 1894, the
“fault or privity” must be the fault or privity of somebody who is not merely a
servant or agent for whom the company is liable but somebody for whom the
company is liable because his action is very action of the company itself (Patrick
Griggs, 1986)
According to Professor Robert Grime’s view in his article “ The loss of the right to
limit”, the “actual fault” of a shipowning company included: a fault brought home to
the Board of Director; the fault of proven “alter ego”, who need not be a Board
member; and the fault of a person, partnership or company which is either a
registered ship’s manager or to whom management has been wholly delegated.
Faults of other will not be the actual fault of the company, but if the delegation of
responsibility to another was improper, faulty or not sufficient supervised, then the
act of delegation might itself be accovmted the actual fault of the shipowning
company.
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What is the exact meaning of privity? Privity means actual positive knowledge or
“turning a blind eye” as Lord Denning said in the Eurysthenes in 1976. When we talk
about privity of the owner, there are many phrases used to describe the individual
who represents the corporate body. Phrases such as “the directing mind and well”,
“the very ego”, the person “for whom the company is liable because his action is the
very action of the company itself’.

The requirement in Article 4 of the ISM Code for the appointment of a designated
person with access to the highest levels of management, and with express duties to
monitor the safety and pollution prevention aspects of the operation of each ship, will
make it impossible for a owner of a vessel claiming limitation of liability under the
1957 Convention to prove the absence of fault or privity if the problems which gave
rise to the casualty were already known to the designated person. It seems likely that
knowledge and records of that designated person may be available to aid claimants in
civil law countries to prove the existence of fault or privity.

On the other hand, the existence of a complete set of ISM Code documentation and
certificates may actually make it easier for a shipowner seeking limitation of liability
in those common law countries where the 1957 Convention still applies to prove the
absence of fault or privity. The ISM Code may therefore bring the application of the
1957 Convention in those civil law and English law countries where it still applies
more closely into line.

4.4 Under the 1976 Limitation Convention
The drafting of Article 4 of this Convention was deliberately intended to make the
loss of the right to limitation of liability much more difficult to prove in order to
counterbalance the substantially increased limits introduced by the Convention .
Article 4 reads: ‘
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“A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it proved that the loss
resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such
loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result.”

It is well known that a heavier burden of proof is required under the new system of
limitation to break limitation as compared with the old system. For a claimant to
break limitation not only does Article 4 require proof that the loss claimed resulted
from a personal act or omission of the legal person of the ship owning company but
also that it was committed either with intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and
with knowledge that such loss would probably result, in other words, the legal person
of the company must have anticipated the likelihood of the loss, but nevertheless
acted or failed to act regardless of that probability. Therefore, mere negligence or
even gross negligence is no longer sufficient to break the right to limitation because
the right to be lost there must be intention to cause loss or damage or recklessness.

There has been no decided case on Article 4 since the 1976 Convention came into
force in 1986, but the question of whose “personal act or omission” will be relevant
in the case of a corporate shipowner has been the subject of academic comment, in a
recent case in the Privy Council on another issue. Meridian Global v. Securities
Commission it was held by their Lordships that the relevant “Rules of Attribution”

must be identified from the true construction of the governing statute or
convention.(RICHARD SHAW, 1998)

The 1976 Convention expressly provides that it is only the “personal” act or
omission of the person liable which will defeat the right to limit. However, it is still
necessary to consider in the case of corporations whose act or omission will be
treated as the “personal” act or omission which may defeat the right to limit. Thus it
seems that the concept of the alter ego co-opted from the law developed from the
limitation provisions of the 1894 MSA will have to be applied in order to ascertain
whose action is the very action of the company itself.
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4.4.1 The “personal liable”
Article 4 of the 1976 Convention speaks of the “personal” act or omission of a
“personal liable” which term presumably encompasses all the various parties
identified in Article 1 which is headed:” persons entitled to limit liability”.
Therefore, a “person liable” could be the shipowner, the charterer, manager,
operator, salvor or liability insurer of the vessel or a fiirther class of person defined
as “ any person for whose act, neglect or default the shipowner or salvor is
responsible”.
Whose “personal” act will defeat the right to limit? The personal act of any one of
the different persons identified in Article 1 will prevent him fi:om limiting his own
liability in the event of a claim against him but will not necessarily defeat the right to
limit any other persons in the same group in the event of a claim against them.
Therefore, if losses arose as a result of the personal act of a ship’s manager he would
not be able to limit liability in the event of a successful claim against him whereas
the shipowner might be able to limit since the act or omission would not be
necessarily be “personal” to him. But the close relationship which frequently exists
between the management and ownership structures the distinction may not be so
clear cut since the alter ego of both “persons” might well be the same.
It is clear from Article 1.1.2 of the ISM Code that the Code identifies within the term
of “company” the owner of the ship and any organisation including a professional
manager or bareboat charterer who has assumed the responsibility for operation of
the ship from the shipowner. The question* arises therefore as to whether the
“personal fault” of such a manager would be imputed to the owner in the context of a
limitation action under the 1976 Convention.
A professional ship manager will probably be the employer of the designated person
under the ship’s SMS. If that person is found to be at fault, but the true owner
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remains ignorant of the problem despite having acted reasonably in appointing a
competent ship manager, then it would be unfair to deprive the owner of limitation of
liability. The wording of the 1976 Convention does not help much, but the insertion
of the word “personal”, which does not appear in other conventions containing
clauses worded similarly to Article 4 suggests a rule of Attribution pointing very
specially to the owner himself, or to the person in a corporate ownership most closely
corresponding to the individual shipowner.

4.4.2

“Intent to cause such loss”

It is clear from these words that in order to deprive the “personal liable” of the right
to limit, it must be proved that the “persona liable” had the subjective intent to cause
the loss. It is not sufficient to prove that a reasonably competent person could not
have not failed to conclude that his act or omission would cause the loss. It must be
shown that the “person liable” himself actively intended the loss. It is difficult to
imagine how anybody could prove this because to do so it would almost seem to be
necessary to explore the mind of the party who had committed the act or expose that
person to truth drugs or some equally infallible method of exposing the true
intentions of the person concerned.
4.4.3 “Recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result”

The meaning of the word “recklessly” or “recklessness” has been construed by the
courts in the United kingdom in a number of cases such as R.v. Caldwell and R.v.
Lawrence Stephen. It connotes either carelessness or utter heedlessness of
consequence with the result that the perpetrator is deemed to have considered neither
the probability or even the possibility of a likely result.(Patrick Griggs, 1986)

Guidance may be sought in the case of Goldman v Thai airway International
Ltd(1983). The Court of Appeal said that the word “recklessly” had to be construed
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in Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention along with the words “and with knowledge
that damage would probably result”. Eveleigh LJ stated at page 700 that:
“An act may be reckless when it involves risk, even though it can not be said the
danger envisaged is a probable consequence. It is enough that it is a possible
consequence, although there comes a point when the risk is so remote that it would
not be considered reckless to take it. We look for an element of recklessness which is
perhaps more clearly indicated in the French term “temerairement”. Article 25
however, refers not to possibility, but to the probability of resulting damage. Thus
something more than a possibility is required . The word “probable” is a common
enough word. I understand that to mean something is likely to happen. I think that
that is what is meant in Article 25. In other words, one anticipates damage from the
act or omission.”

4.5 the Effect of the ISM Code
It is doubtful that the ISM Code will have a significant effect upon a shipowner’s
right to limit under the 1976 Convention. Leaving aside the possibility of deliberate
intent, the claimant must show that the loss resulted from personal act or omission of
the shipowner committed recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would
probably result. Rule 4 of the ISM Code establishes a link between the safe operation
of the ship and the highest level of management in the shipowning or operating
company. Therefore, where the wrongful act in question consists of, or arises out of
, a breach of the ISM Code, it should be easier to prove a “personal act or omission”
on the part of the shipowner. The claimant is still left with the tasks of proving
“recklessness” and “knowledge that such loss would probably result”.

If the shipowner has failed to correct a shortcoming aboard the vessel which must
have been apparent from the documents that the Code requires to be produced, the
courts may be prepared to regard such failures as “reckless”
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Wording that is remarkably similar to that of the 1976 Limitation Convention also
appears in the Hague Rules. It will thus be similarly difficult for a claimant to
establish that a carrier is not entitled to limit his liability under the Hague Rules.

It is clear however that the advent of the ISM Code will require management
arrangements to be more transparent, and more subject to regular scrutiny that
hitherto, and this may expose owners to a great risk of challenge to their right to
limitation of liability.
The ISM Code must now represent the internationally recognised standard of good
ship management, and failure to comply with the Code’s principles(not just failure to
produce a DOC and SMC) will amoimt to a lack of due diligence by the owner.
Moreover, Articles 9 and 10.2 of the Code requires the owner to establish procedures
for the reporting , investigation and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and
hazardous occiurence. It appears probable that cargo interests will be encouraged by
these requirements to demand discovery of all such records and documents relating
to a ship on which a claim has arisen and possibly her sister ship.

4.6 The Designated Person(DP)
With the purpose of preventing or minimising the occurrence of marine accidents
resulting from human error, and emphasising the onshore management, the new
regime introduced by the Code is the “Designated Person”(DP) in article 4 as
follows:
“To ensure the safe operation of each ship and to provide a link between the
company and those onboard, every company, as appropriate, should designate a
person or persons shore having direct access to the highest level of management.
The responsibility and authority of the designated person or persons should include
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monitoring the safety and pollution aspects of the operation of each ship and
ensuring the adequate resource and a shore-based support are applied, as required.”

This Article has created a totally new post within any shipowning or operating
company. It is believed that this post and function is not only a very responsible one
but also very delicate. The DP has the responsibility and authority for ensuring that
the objectives and requirements of the SMS are earned out. Non-conformities will be
reported directly to the designated person who has direct access to the highest level
of management. A non-conformity is defined as a deviation from the requirements
specified on the owner’s SMS. In many cases, unseaworthiness.
The future will show that there is considerable room for argument, how far the
responsibility of the DP goes as far as safety and environment pollution prevention is
concerned. He or she will be the link between the company and those on board. In
past times this was the superintendent. The person appointed as the DP is required to
be able to speak and understand the language that is spoken on board and has direct
access to the highest level of management.

In addition,

according to the ICS

Guidelines, the DP should meet the following requirements:
“ The designated person(s) should be suitably qualified and experienced in the safety
and pollution control aspects of ship operations and should be fully conversant with
the company’s safety and environmental protection policies.
The designated person should have the

independence and authority to report

deficiencies observed to the highest level of management.”
The pitfall may lie in the management not taking the DP seriously. According to the
requirements of the ISM Code, any information about inadequacies in safety and
environment pollution prevention may be attributed to the management, who can not
escape the responsibility if he or she failed to be active response or only turned “a
blind eye” on the deficiencies that the DP has reported. However, the DP also has to
be alert as well as to a failure on his part to provide for the adequate resources and
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shore based support, which may impose a personal liability on him. If a DP performs
his job properly and skilfully- as the traditional superintendent did, this will be a
rewarding position, giving him satisfaction that he personally not only contributed to
but also provided for the safety of his seafaring colleagues and also the integrity of
the ship and cargo or passenger carried.
What is the legal position of the DP? What is the legal consequence o^the DP’s
personal act or omission? In other words, could the DP’s personal act or mission
result the shipowner losing his right to limit liability? Another question to be asked
is whether the knowledge acquired by the designated person or persons about
deficiencies in a ship or the management practice of the relevant company in the
exercise of his duties could amount to knowledge of the highest level of management
of the company. Some people said that the DP is part of that management and his
action can represent “ the direct mind and well” of the company, therefore, his
personal act or mission could make the shipowner no right to limit liability.

The author has the totally different views from the above mentioned. Firstly, the DP
is not part of the management, he is lower down the authority chain with the specific
task of monitoring the safety and pollution prevention aspects of the ship operation
as well as ensuring that adequate resource and shore-based support are applied. If
doing his job properly, he will get large number of information from the ships much
of which will stay with him and some of which will be commimicated to others
laterally in the organisation of action, and some of which will be reported to his
superiors.

Secondly, the DP’s personal act or omission shall not defeat the

shipowner’s right of limitation of liability. According to Article 4 of the 1976
Convention, a personal liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it proved that
the loss resulted from his “personal” act or mission, in other words, if loss arose as a
result of the personal act of the DP, he would not be able to limit his liability, which
can not affect the right of the shipowner to limit his liability because the act or
omission would not be necessarily

the shipowner’s personal act or omission.
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However, the new regime of the DP can make the operation of the ship more
transparency and also force the shipowner unable to turn a blind eye for the non
conformities existing in the SMS, otherwise it might threat his right of limitation of
his liability.
For example, the problem of crew fatigue on board the ship due to lack of competent
officers has been reported to the DP, who has reported this non-conformity to the
top management . However, the shipowner failed to take appropriate corrective
actions timely, one day there was a collision accident occurring on the specific ship
and resulted loss of life as well as serious marine pollution. Investigation indicated
the accident was caused by the duty officer falling asleep on the bridge due to
excessive work and lack of sleep, in other words, there was a causal link between
the lack of competent officers on board ship and the collision. In that case, the
claimant was easy to prove that the loss resulted from the shipowner’s personal
omission committed with recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would
probably result and further could break the shipowner right of limitation of his
liability. According to Article 10.2 of the ISM Code, the company should ensure that.
“ inspections are held at appropriate intervals; any non-conformity is reported, with
its possible cause, if known; appropriate corrective action is taken; and records of
these activities are maintained.” Therefore it is favour of the claimant to find the
evidence if there is the shipowner’s personal act or omission through these records
when an accident occurring.
There is no doubt that requirements of the ISM code to document thoroughly all
measures following an incident will provide a fertile ground for legal disputes in the
years to come.

Chapter 5 The Impact on the Marine Insurance

Shipping is one of the highest risk industries in the world. During the routine
operation of ships, they will encounter all kinds of risks not only from the sea but
also from the human beings. Heavy weather, rough sea, grounding, collisions and
fire etc. will result in loss of life, personal injury, damage to property and/or serious
pollution to the environment especially to the marine enviroiunent; at the same time,
maritime fraud and piracy etc. , man-made disasters, are also likely threat to the
sustainable development of the shipping industry. Therefore, it is necessary for all
parties engaged in the shipping business to insure their properties as well as their
liabilities against the negative consequences of such disasters. They can keep the
shipping business running by sharing the risks among them through the insurance.

The entry into force of ISM Code is to ensure safety at sea, the prevention of human
injury or loss of life and the avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular to
the marine environment and to the property.

The ISM Code can affect several

aspects of marine insurance. It has some potential impacts on the insurance rules,
seaworthiness, duty of disclosure and cover.

5.1 Change of rules

The Intemational Group clubs made

recommendations to their member clubs to

change the rules to support the implementation of the ISM Code.

The

recommendations were that club rules should be changed to achieve at least three
criteria: firstly, the possession of valid ISM Code certificates in accordance with
flag state requirements would be obligatory as a term of the insurance; secondly the
uncertificated member would be denied the right to recover claims arising from
failure to comply with flag state ISM Code requirements. And finally clubs would
include, in their existing programmes of ships visits and inspections, checks that
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there was an effective safety management system in operation and in compliance
with ISM Code requirements.(Fairplay, 1998)

The rules of all International Group P&I clubs will contain a provision that the
entered vessel shall comply with statutory requirements. Skuld Club rules have been
amended to read;
“The member shall comply with all statutory requirements of the state of the vessel’s
flag, relating to the construction, adaptation, condition, fitment, equipment, manning,
operation and management of the entered vessel(including applicable requirements
of the ISM Code) and maintain the validity of all statutory certificates issued by or
on behalf of the vessel’s flag state in relation to such requirements. In the event of
any failiure to comply with this requirement (whether or not the member has been
negligent), the member shall not be entitled to any recovery from the Association,
except insofar as the member can prove that liabilities, losses, expenses or costs
would have been incurred in any event and would have been covered by the
Association if the member had complied with those requirements...’’(Skuld, 1999)

Skud(and some other clubs have publicly said the same) also will decline to accept as
new members any shipowners that do not have valid ISM certificates as required by
the vessel’s flag state.

A new clause was introduced in the cargo insurance by London’s cargo underwriters
in May 1998 as an active step to support what the ISM Code is trying to achieve.
The Joint Cargo Committee(JCC) of Lloyd’s and the Institute of London
Underwriters(ILU) have devised and circulated a new clause within the market,
which is being recommended as an ISM endorsement. According the new clause,
cargo owners who are aware of or should ha\^been aware thaLthe insured cargojs
carried by a non-ISM compliant vessel or whose owners/operatois do npi hold_a
DOC will^i^ ins.urance cover from jcargoamderwriters—However, irmocent cargo
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insured who may unwittingly find their cargoes on non-certified vessels are still be
entitled to recover from their cargo underwriters.

5.2

Unseaworthiness and cover
The traditional legal basis of carriage of goods by sea, and of insurance for P&I
liabilities, is the owner’s duty to exercise “due diligence” to make sure a vessel is
seaworthy. The principle was introduced by the US Harter Act in 1893 and embodied
in the Hague and HagueA^isby rules. Article 3 of the HagueA^isby rules stated that “
the carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due
diligence to:

•

Make the ship seaworthy;

•

Properly man, equip and supply the ship;

•

Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in
which the goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and
preservation.”
As far as the impact of the ISM Code on due diligence is concerned, the requirement
of the Code that all procedures be the subject of documentation will inevitably
provide more chance and means to find an act or omission on thejpar^q^f the
shipowner that will ground liability or lend support to contentions being advanced in
litigation. The ISM Code provides a firamework for detailed procedure with regard
to^ aspects of ship management, maintenance and operations. Failure to abide by
these requirements may result in inference as to what of due diligence on the part of
the shipowner.
While the requirements of the ISM Code that each company must keep records of
orders and instructions to its crew, ensure their adequate understanding of rules,
regulations and guidelines, keep documentation of all activities in a safety
management manual, and delegate the monitoring of safety and pollution prevention
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aspects to a designated person will provide evidence of exercise of due diligence
under the HagueA/’isby rule, equally any non-compliance with the Code or
deficiencies in the operational system of a company will undoubtedly provide
ammunition to the opposition.
Although the Code is not directly concerned with issues of civil liability and the
insurance, it is inevitable that it will have a significant inipagt^njhev^yjui^^
the^carrier.’^ liability is assjgs§£dJjUh&jy^

or_^ereJher^,loss or

Hamape tn cargo. Among the issues of ciYilJhahiIilv>„ssamd;hffie§sislheo^^
might be most affected.
/Seaworthiness is covered in the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, Hamburg Rules, charter
parties and marine insurance policies. The traditional test is that, for a vessel to be
j seaworthy, it “ must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary, careful and
\ prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage
I having regard to all the probable circumstances of it.(Mc Fadden v Blue Star Line,

1905).
The impact of the ISM Code will be in the following aspects:
First, it is normal to expect that vessels are in possession of documents which b^on
their seaworthiness, such as certificates required by the law of the flag state or by the
laws, regulations and lawful practices of the government and local authorities at the
vessel’s ports of call. Failure to possess necessary documentation, including those
provided by the Code could amount to unseaworthiness.
Second, even if a satisfactory SMS is in place, but the owner or operator has,„^^^
live up to it on the occasion in question, this may result in arguments either that the
ship is seaworthy due to the SMS ndt being implemented properly, or that the owner
failed to properly care for the cargo. It would be wrong to say that the Safety
Management Certificate was merely an additional certificate for inspection.
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The Hague-Visby Rules require that for liability to be shown not only was the vessel
unseaworthy but the unseaworthiness resulted from a lack of due diligence on the
part of the shipowner.
According to this rul^j^^ownersythat fulfil this obligation were not liable for crew
errors in navigation or maintenance. Cargo interests have rarely attempted the
difficult task of proving negligence on the part of shore management. However, the
Code’s requirement for a continuous interface at top management level between ship
and shore places a strict responsibility on senior management to ensure that safety
systems are maintained and documented throughout the voyage. This means failure
to provide a proper system for thejvessels’ management and operation may well
amount to “unseaworthniess”. The owner will no longer be able to plead “I did my
best, I didn’t know the ship wasn’t seaworthy.” Furthermore, th^junderwriters-may
successfully argue that non-compliance _ with—ISM—CQdfi..„jnay amount to
rmseaworthiness, and it will be harder to jet the recovery from the underwriters.

In addition, under the Code these defences will no longer be available where the loss
is caused by a failure of safety management. The ISM chain of command to top
management through a designated person precludes a plea of ignorance. Either the
owner or the designated person will have known: or if they did not, they would be in
breach of the Code.
There is an undeniable connection between rules to improve maritime safety and
issues of unseawo’rthiness. The comprehensive nature of the new requirements makes
it easier to link unseaworthiness with failure in compliauce. Unseaworthiness can be
proved in any instance where proper maintenance is not planned, whfire..planned
maintenance is not carried out, or where simlar defects have been detected in the
past on the same .ship.x)iu)ii.simila]ijship. but have not bee.n_rectifiedJ3]lihe vessel in
question. The Code’s hidden burdens on owners will make it harder for clubs to
avoid or minimise liability for cargo claims.
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The consequence of unseaworthiness has been very serious impact on the insured
and usually would amount to the insured losing of right to recover any loss or
damages resulted from unseaworthiness. For example, Marine Insurance Act 1906,
Section 39(5) stated;

Where, with the privity of the insured, the ship is sent to

sea in an unseaworthy state, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to
imseaworthiness.”
Among all implied warranties in marine insurance, the most important one is the
implied warrancty in any voyage policy that the ship will be seaworthy when the risk
commence. With respect of time policy,

there is no such implied warranty of

CKAO&fH.' a_i^

seaworthness, except that if with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in
an unseaworthy state, the underwriters are free from liability for any loss attributable
to such unseaworthiness.
It can be seen that issues(of^aworthines^will therefore be directly relevant to an
owner’s ability to recover under both a voyage and a time policy. The Code is
likely to have a direct impact on these issues. First it may be used as a yardsticlTfor
ascertaining whether the ship is indeed unseaworthy. And secondly, it may have an
img^loii the question of whether the owner was privity to this.
In addition to the newly introduced designated person regime. Article 9 of the Code
provides that the onboard Safety Management System(SMS)

should include

procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are
reported to the company, investigated and analysed with the objective of improving
safety and pollution prevention. And the company should establish procedures for
the implementing of corrective action. Failure of reporting, investigating, analysing
and correcting these non-conformities may amount to turning a blind eye, and result
in constituting privity to unseawothiness on the part of the shipowner.
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The Code requires that the designated person reports to the highest levels of
management, and also requires that the highest levels of management enquire of the
designated person what problem exist and what action is being taken. It is therefore
impossible for an onerating.jc.cmiianY-tajdalm ignoraa.c.e_.Qrany problem that may
lead to unseaworthiness in a vessel. Failure to be aware is no longer a mitigating
...

^
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circumstance for the operator. On the contrary it becomes an evidence of unsafe
operation because the ISM Code has 1^ down an industry standard that should
make ignorance upposahlfi.-

5.3 Disclosure anc
Before entering into a contact of insurance, it is important for the insurer to obtain
the best available information about the risk to be undertaken. At the same time, it is
important that the apparent scope of risk does not change significantly during the
insurance contract’s duration.
The person effecting insurance and/or the assured plays a central role in supplying
information regarding risks, and change of risks, of the item or interest. Moreover,
the same person may increase the risk of encountering an insured accident through
his actions or failure to take actions. Therefore, it is important for the insurer to
obtain correct disclosure from the insured.
The duty of disclosure of the insured means the duty of the person effecting
insurance to make correct representation and full and complete disclosme as to
circumstance which are material when the insurer is to decide, if and under what
conditions, he will undertake the insurance. If the duty of disclosure has been
breached, the insurer normally has the right to end the contractual relationship for the
future.
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The specific requirements of the disclosure written in the rule 28.1.1 of Skuld are as
follows;
The member shall make full and correct disclosure to the Association, before the
contract of insurance is concluded, of every circm|^t^^
(a)

which is known to the member or any agent effecting the insurance on his behalf,
or which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known by the member or

agent and
(b)
which would influence the Association in deciding whether and what terms to
provide cover.
According to the ISM Code requirements, all deficiencies found during the routine
operation of the ship must be recorded and also be required to report to the shorebased management of the company. The company has an obligation to carry out
safety audits. The results of the safety audits should be brought to the attention of all
personnel having responsibility in the area involved so that timely corrective actions
can be taken on any non-conformities found.

It is obviously that the reporting and

auditing^stem will make the operation of the ship much more transpajept. This is
thought to be especially so in relation to the designated person and his direct access
to the top management.
The shipping company must disclose full and complete material information to the
insurer at the time of making the contract of insurance. Especially he qr_shejmust
disclose all deficiencies-ofthe-SMS-and defeats that he should know existing during
the operation of the ship because-hq.or_she has„no^e^u^Jp_:^tq_teo]^hese
deficiencies according the ISM Code.
A purpose of the ISM Code is to establish a chain of command leading up the
“highest level of management” of a shipowning or operating company andjbc_eyery
person in that c-b^in with a degree of responsibility for monitoring safety procedures
aboard the vesself As a re^r^t^ill.b^comejnpje diff^^^^
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a-person or persons

who comprise the alter egqjiCihjei‘loamanagement” of an ins^ed^company to claim
that they “did not know of defects aboacdihe vessel.

A situation which may frequently happen is that, although the owner has obtained all
necessary ISM documents and certificates, he failed to disclose to his insurers some
defects in the SMS or in its implementation, which should have been disclosed and
which in due course become apparent from a review of the ship’s ISM records
following a casualty and a claim on the policy, or which is discovered during port
state control inspection. In such circumstances, the insurer may be liable to avoid his
liability under the policy.

more complicated situation will arise if the potential member informs the club that
he has DOC and SMC in place, but later on it appears that this is not correct. If
incorrect information was given and the insured can, in one way or another, be
blamed for giving such incorrect information, then there would be no cover if the
insurer would not have written the risk, had the correct information been disclosed.

5.4

Non-conformity and cover

If a vessel has been gitered when the owners or managers have their DOC in place
and the vessel its SMC, then there is a continuous obligation on the member to
comply with all the statutory requirements of the flag state of the vessel including the
applicable requirements of the ISM Code.

^ P&I insurance is a liability insurance and the whole idea of the cover is for the

insured member to have insurance in place for errors and omissions made by the
employees such as the captain, officers or the crew, for which the member can be
held li^le. The introduction of the ISM Code dPfiaJiotchaageJthiS-aJLall. It is still the
intention to provide cover Jo a member for the captain’s breach of instructions in
relation to what he has to do before leaving a port, or an engine officer’s breach of
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instructions in relation to bunkering of the vessel. This would be irrespective of such
breaches being seen pbsequently by an auditor as non-conformities.(Hans Levy,
BMCO, 1998)

r

J

^

However, if a non-conformity is reported to the member and he does not take any
steps to rectify the non-conformity or, if the member turns a blind eye by not
ensming that a system is in place where non-conformities are reported to him, then
the member shall not be entitled to any recovery from the Association except in so
far as the member can prove that liabilities, losses, expenses and costs would have
been incurred in any event according to Sl^Mmle 29.1T0^

(This rule
apply whether or not the member has been negligent. On the other
harrdTifironly applicable to losses where there is a causal relation between the loss
and the member’s non-conformity. In other words, the losses where there is no such
causal relation will still be covered by the club.
The rule in relation to compliance with fSM is not different from the one with respect
to the member’s obligations to comply with other statutory requirements. But the
reporting requirements of the ISM Code will make it easier to investigate the extent
to which the member has followed

up

on reported non-conformities, and also if the

^^ember has cared whether such_non::CQ^liiJi£^^
^

that there will

reported to him. It is

some cases where the consequences .of.thcLmemherls

faihir£lcu::ornplY vdth the ISM Code will lead to,no recovery from the club.

Although the ISM Code has several aspectsJojaffect the marine insurance, it will not
be used by P&I club and underwriters as an .excuse for refusing or delaying the
payment of valid claims. Over the last few years we have seen both a reduction in
hull losses and that P&I claims have stabilised. Perhaps the preppation for the ISM
Code is part .oXihe^^reasomforthis so that to a certain degree the objectives of the
.XlndediaveJjeeiialre^^ reached.
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5 Evidence
When a claim arises, questions ,are_.aslad^sJxx^iiether the ship was seaworthy,
whether the carrier failed to care for the goods, whether the crew were competent,
whether the limitation could be broken, and whether the underwriters and or P&I
insurance could pull cover legally. In order to solve these issues, the claimant seeks
disclosure of those documents in the owner’s possession which go to demonstrate
how well the vessel has been maintained, how well qualified were the crew, when
was the last class survey and how safety was managed both on board the vessel and
ashore. Before the Code came into force, it was difficult to get sufficient documents
for these purposes.
The most important aspect of the Code is the fact that each shipping company must
now have a written document in which its policies and instructions to its crew will be
written and clear lines of communications between the ship and shore-based
management exists.
Furthermore, records of all reports to and from the ship and the designated person
must be kept. This system of transparency would allow interested parties to go
through these records and scrutinise the whole management system of a company.
This recording of information will allow more details to find their way to courts to
provide evidence on the facts of each particular case. The types of documents that
could interest potential claimants include:
•

Documents relating to frequency of inspections

•

Documents showing non-conformity together with reports of any known or
probable causes

•

Documents indicating corrective actions and results

•

Documents recording the maintenance of such activities
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Documents illustrating the crew’s history, ongoing training and competence for
their current jobs
If these documents are asked for and not provided, this may prejudice the owner, as
the absence will reflect badly on the owner. He will not merely be able to say that the
documents have been retained or have been lost, since Article 2 of the Code requires
the company to establish and maintain procedures to control all documents and data

I^

which are relevant to the SMS. ^
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Chapter 6 Conclusion

The purpose of the Code is to ensure safe practice in ship operation, to safeguard
against identified risks, to improve safety management skills of personnel and thus
achieve a substantial decrease in or even elimination of substandard and dangerous
ships.
Briefly, the Code aims to reduce human error and improve management on shore by
introducing mandatory rules and regulations for systematic operational system and
procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the Code. It requires a
designated person or persons, having direct access to the highest level of
management,

to be appointed ashore and have responsibility and authority to

monitor aspects of safety and pollution prevention and ensure that adequate resource
including shore-based support are applied.
The ISM Code is an important step in the right direction. Main element of the ISM
Code is to establish a safety system involving the ship as well as the shofe-based
personnel, including certain procedures and documentation in connection with the
implementation and maintenance of the Safety Management System(SMS).

The ISM Code requires that the minimum standard to be met by a careful shipowner
based on the existing doctrine of due diligenge^"Whatls hew isithat lEe~sMpowner is
now obliged to establish that a system exists to secure that due diligence is exerted
und-juaintainpd -^oth on board the vessel and ashore, and that routines are
established to follow up and to report any so called non-conformities, accidents and
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hazardous situations, with the objective of improving safety and pollution
prevention.

The ISM Code seems “j^er tiger” unless it is implemented fully and effectively by
the shipowner as well as flag states. It is the shipowner’s primary responsibility to
establish the Safety Management System(SMS) and ensure this system is really
working both on board the vessels and shore, otherwise it is just creating additional
certificates for inspection. Shipowners, Flag states. Classification Society and port
State shall work together and maintain co-operation to ensure that the ISM Code can
be well implemented and all goals of the ISM Code will be achieved, namely

Meanwhile, the ISM Code has some legal impacts on shipowner’s civil liability
related for loss or damage to cargoes, on the limitation of the shipowner’s liability
and on the insurance.
The ISM Code sets un another standard to assess whether the ship i|^awoith^^ the
comaeiKfi-a£Jhe_vjoyageyyilhihft,ex^^Q^Jia-diligenceLhyJhft.ihipowner.J^conformity of the ISM Code woulxLamojLjnt To unseaworthiness and consequently
make the shipowner be unable to escape the liability for the loss or damage to the
cargoes resulted from the unseaworthiness. It has been said that the introduction and
implementation of the ISM Code will make the job easier for the courts, as the judge
will now have available first hand evidence as to whether tHe shore-based operation
and the routines oh board were organisedHin^dili^ehTwajrThexourt would also be
able to compare a shipowner’s operation with the^xretingmiiHinuun standard of due
diligence in order to evaluate his performance.

/

The Code is not directly concerned with the shipowner’s ability to limit liability to a
particular figure xmder any limitation conventions. However, the standard of
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supervision and management required by the Code is bound to have an effect on
assessing “actual fault or privity” or “recklessness” in the limitation cases.

Implementation of the Code will make it easier to establish actual fault or privity on
the part of the owner. It is a clear obligation for the top management of any
shipowing company to put an SMS into place, but not merely put onboard.
Therefore, having set up an SMS and trained the crew to abide with it may not be a
defence for the owner to discharge such a duty.

In litigation, it is the shipowner on whom the burden of proving the absence of fault
or privity is placed. Fulfilment of the Code could be very helpful for the owner to do
so. Otherwise, disclosure of the Code-inspired documentation will assist the claimant
to challenge this.

It is more difficult to prove the owner’s recklessness, and a mere failure to comply
with the requirements of the ISM Code will seldom be sufficient for this purpose.
However, the reporting procedure, the designated person regime and the
documentation required by the Code will draw away the owner’s defence of not
being aware. If he does not know, he is not applying the standard of prudence an
average shipowner should demonstrate. If the senior management then deliberately
ignores or turns a blind eye to serious problems, the owner could be held to have
been reckless.

P &I clubs rules contain a provision that vessels entered shall comply with the
utory requirements. As the ISM Code forms a part of SOLAS, the lack of the
necessary certification under the ISM Code will result in the termination or waiver of
the cover. This will be the position, irrespective of the fact the vessel is actually in
class and her technical condition in other respects satisfies the club’s requirements.
Non-certification can be described as a lack of formal compliance with the ISM
Code. Lack of compliance might be the failure by the shore-based operation to give
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instructions or follow up that instructions are complied with. Other examples are
inadequate or obsolete reporting procedures, lack of, or insufficient, instructions by
the master, training of the crew and reporting systems to the shore-based operations.
^e ISM Code, with its detailed documentation system, will have a direct impact on
proving that the vessel was seaworthy as of the moment of the attachment of the
insurance and the vessel owner did not knowingly permit the vessel to break ground
in an unseaworthy condition.
The ISM Code requires that non-conformities be reported by the master to the
company. It also provides for the recording and alleviation of deficiencies. It requires
extensive internal safety audits which must be brought to the attention of all
personnel having responsibility in the area involved and requires that management
persoimel take timely corrective action on deficiencies found. Although the gaol is to
correct deficiencies, their very record could give rise to a claim by an insurer that the
vessel was not seaworthy at the time the insurance attached if any deficiencies
existed at that time.
The ISM code requires such extensive documentation of shipboard operations, it may
provide the owner with a greater ability to prove due diligence that he had in the past.
On the other hand, because of reporting of non-conformities, deficiencies and so
forth, unless the documentation is carefully crafted, the ISM code may haveJlie
opposite result and_gjyjmU;a^nding of want
seaworthv. which will impact both on insurance and cargo damage issues.
On the other hand, a shipping company being sued will now be subject to a much
^^ore detailed scrutiny by the court and the plaintiffs lawyer. While this may be a
useful way of having all facts disclosed, it can certainly also be misused by plaintiffs
lawyers to embark on a “fishing expedition”
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It is obviously not the aim of the ISM Code to encourage such behaviour, but it is an
unavoidable side effect. It will be up to the courts and arbitration tribunals to make
f*“***"
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.........

sure the ISM code is not misused in this way, and to determine the invisible
borderlines between privileged documents and evidence which may be disclosed.

Although there are certain drawbacks, the spirit behind the ISM Code is clear,
namely to improve the safe operation of ships and pollution prevention.

Much

depends on the implementation in practice, but the training and awareness of shorebased staff and of the seafarers is the best way of reducing maritime accidents.
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